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Abstract
The stereotype of “Platonic love” that developed during the Renaissance implies a  type of 
relationship, between two people of the opposite gender, which does not involve sexual activ-
ity. A new examination of certain relevant texts by Neoplatonists such as Plotinus, Porphyry, 
Hierocles, Hermias, Proclus and Olympiodorus, written during the period of Late Antiquity, 
establish that the question of sexuality is present in the very architecture of their systems, thus 
maintaining a coherent approach over time. “Mixed love”, tending towards the sexual union 
that enables the conception of children, is morally good. Through an exegesis of the Sympo-
sium, Phaedrus and First Alcibiades, each of these Neoplatonic philosophers explores sexuality 
through the prisms of cosmology, ethics and political theory.
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In the Life of Isidore, Damascius tells the story of the philosopher Theosebius (a disciple 
of Hierocles of Alexandria and an admirer of Epictetus),1 who was not able to have chil-
dren and as a result, suggested to his wife that she should either swap her wedding ring 
for a chastity ring (i.e. become celibate), or marry another man. She chose a life of absti-
nence, and so the couple lived out the days of their marriage (with the help of this “talis-
man” (φυλακτήριον), which also acted as a “contraceptive”) without maintaining sexual 
relations (Fr. 110.87.19–89.4 Zintzen = Fr. 46E Athanassiadi).2 This story illustrates, with 
particular clarity, the Neoplatonic view of the purpose of marriage.
Three centuries earlier, in his treatise On Love (3.5), Plotinus (204/5 – 270 AD) con-
sidered sexual union, with its basis in nature, to be morally good (Wolters 1972: pp. 
xvi–xxii, n. 1). The desire for eternity gives marriage a moral value, as the procreation 
of new human beings is good in itself, since it represents an inferior and alloyed form 
of the desire for beauty. The manifestation of the intelligible world in the things of the 
sensible world is something beautiful. “For these certainly want to ‘bring forth (τίκτειν) 
in beauty (ἐν καλῷ)’: for it would be absurd for nature, when it wants to create beautiful 
things, to want to generate in ugliness (ἐν αἰσχρῷ)” (Plot. 3.5.1.28–30; transl. Armstrong 
1967: p. 169). Procreation allows us to see the immortal in what is mortal. Plotinus draws 
on Plato’s Symposium (206c4–5) – “procreate in what is beautiful” –3 in order to affirm 
that mixed love (which is also a love of beauty) is fecund, although it corresponds to 
a desire for sexual union, rather than to a contemplative love. As such, mixed love wishes 
to procreate with a beautiful body.
For Plato, love is inseparable from fecundity and always begets children, whether 
physical or spiritual; for Plotinus, however, only mixed love is fecund: in other words, 
love and fecundity are not necessarily connected, given that only biological procreation 
arising from sexual union is fecund.4 Therefore, the pure love of bodies is not sexual; 
rather, it is solely and exclusively contemplative. Nonetheless, as Plotinus explains, the 
desire for fecundity can be based on the desire to imitate the relationship between the 
eternal and the beautiful, in light of the fact that the eternal nature of intelligible forms, 
which is identified with the primary Beauty in the strictest sense of the term, and every-
thing that proceeds from it, is beautiful (Plot. 3.5.1.44–46; see also 1.6.9.34–42). As such, 
fecundity aims to imitate eternity through the perpetuation of the generations.
1 Damascius described him as the Epictetus of his era; indeed, Theosebius considered Epictetus to be a Pla-
tonist, rather than a Stoic (Dam. V. Isid. Fr. 109.85.14–87.17 Zintzen = Fr. 46D Athanassiadi).
 This paper benefited from the support of two Spanish R&D projects: “Lecturas neoplatónicas sobre la 
inmortalidad del alma: de Plotino a Damascio” (Ref. HAR2017-83613-C2-2-P) and “Pensar las emociones 
en la Atenas democrática: diálogo entre la comedia y la filosofía (Pathe) – Programa Logos Fundación 
BBVA de ayudas a la investigación en el área de Estudios Clásicos 2019”, and is part of the activities of the 
UAM Research Group: Influences of Greek Ethics on Contemporary Philosophy (Ref. F-055). I thank the 
anonymous referees who kindly reviewed this paper and provided valuable suggestions and comments.
2 Regarding the position occupied by Theosebius in the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria, see e.g. I. Hadot 
(2015: pp. 3–5) and Goulet (2016: pp. 1128–1129).
3 τίκτειν δὲ ἐν [μὲν αἰσχρῷ οὐ δύναται,] ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. On this topic, see Morvan (2013: pp. 175–176).
4 See e.g. Armstrong (1967: p. 170, n. 1), and Hadot (1990: pp. 27–28).
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Love, whether of a moderate or perturbed nature, is born out the desire for beauty 
itself before anything else (Plot. 3.5.1.20–26; see Hadot 1990: p. 151). Plotinus alludes 
to the myth of Phaedrus (249d–250b): the soul, as it has already known the essence of 
beauty during its previous existence, is able to recognise it through memory, in the 
image of sensible beauty; thus, the memory of true beauty gives wings to the lover.
Plotinus makes a distinction between “moderate” (σώφρων) love and “vulgar” (αἰσχρός) 
love (Plot. 3.5.1.13–14). In the Platonic tradition, the adjective αἰσχρός, which is opposed 
to καλός, has a physical and aesthetic connotation (“ugly”, “deformed”)5 as well as an 
ethical and civic one (“shameful”, “vile”, and also “disgraceful”, “ignoble”).6 In his trea-
tise On Beauty, Plotinus states that αἰσχρός (Plot. 1.6.5.23–58),7 referring to a form of 
sexual union that implies shame, is nothing more than an adventitious event in the life of 
the soul. However, this “vulgar”8 act is not specifically related to homosexuality;9 rather, 
it can be applied to all sexual practices. As such, the term implies a moral reprobation.
There can be no fecundity or procreation in what is “vulgar” or “shameful”, as the 
concepts are dissonant. For Plotinus, fecundity and procreation refer to the idea of 
“nature” (φύσις), which, as it is the lower part of the soul, directs the formation of the 
body during procreation. Sexual activity that conforms to nature must take the corre-
sponding limits into account, in order to avoid deviating from its course.
Thus, the path of sexual union is in accordance with nature (κατὰ φύσιν) (Plot. 
3.5.1.42). The love that wishes to procreate and is related to sensible beauty, provided 
it remains moderate, is not morally reproachable;10 however, an immoderate sexual 
union may result in moral failure. “If they remain moderate (σώφροσι) there is no error 
(ἀναμάρτητος) in their intimacy with the beauty here below (τὸ τῇδε καλὸν οἰκείωσις), 
but it is error to fall away into sexual intercourse (πρὸς μίξιν ἔκπτωσις ἁμαρτία)” (Plot. 
3.5.1.36–38; transl. Armstrong 1967: p. 171, slightly amended). Here, “immoderate” cor-
responds to an unchecked appetite for pleasure, which ignores procreation and there-
fore deviates from what is “natural”. Moral failure disfigures love and transforms it into 
5 See Pl. Smp. 211a3. Beauty lies in measure, proportion and symmetry, which are also the qualities that 
pertain to what is beautiful and what is good; or the qualities that they present, according to Philebus 
(64e5–6), “the force of the good has taken refuge in an alliance with the nature of the beautiful (ἡ τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν)”.
6 See Pl. Ap. 28c3, 28c9; and DGE s.v. A and B.
7 On the meaning of αἰσχρός, see DGE s.v., and Dover (1979: p. 159). For Plotinus, ugliness is not 
a function of either form or divine reason (λόγος) (Plot. 1.6.2.14–16); for this reason, he affirms that 
matter is ugly in itself, and not just by accident (Plot. 3.6.11.27). Thus, an examination of ugliness must be 
conducted in parallel to that of evil (Plot. 1.6.6.22). Indeed, matter is identified with evil and primitive 
ugliness (Plot. 1.8.5). The formula of kakos kaischros corresponds to matter (ὕλη), to non-being, the final 
link in the processional chain; in contrast, being, form and beauty all coincide in Intelligence. However, 
Plotinus dissociates Beauty (καλόν), which resides in Intelligence, from Good (ἀγαθόν), which he con-
nects to the One, the first principle that lies beyond beauty and the intelligible. True beauty is only the 
sign or trace of the One. On ugliness in Plato and Plotinus, see Aubry (2013: pp. 34–37, 45–46).
8 In a sense close to 2 DGE “obscene”.
9 Plotinus criticises the Gnostics for their disorderly approach to sex, in terms of the education of young 
people and with regard to women more generally (Plot. 2.9.17.28).
10 Every production, and every action, is a weakening of contemplation (Plot. 3.8.4.31–47).
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something vulgar and shameful, as it prevents those who commit it from recognising 
ideal beauty and cuts them off from its memory.
Moderate love, if it does not deviate from its path, implies the sexual union that is 
necessary for procreation. Mixed love (μικτὸς ἔρως) (Plot. 3.5.1.40–46; 1.57) is not limited 
to contemplation of the beautiful: it also desires beautiful bodies and to procreate with 
the beautiful bodies that it desires (Pl. Smp. 206e8). Consequently, it is not satisfied with 
the simple contemplation of beauty; it also needs to (re)produce (itself) in a beautiful 
object.11
However, this mixed love can become deviated and abandon the path marked out by 
nature (Plot. 3.5.1.50–55). The intense pleasure of sexual union can bring about this 
deviation in the lovers’ primary aim (Plot. 3.5.1.38), even causing them to wish to pro-
create in a manner that is against the law and against nature.12 In a sexual relationship 
that is in accordance with nature, pleasure is only an accompaniment to the sexual act; 
it is neither its purpose nor its guiding force. The key to ensuring mixed love remains 
moderate, and remains on the path marked out by nature, lies in controlling pleasure.
Following an initial bipartite classification (Plot. 3.5.1.12–14), Plotinus establishes sev-
eral categories for lovers of sensible beauty, in accordance with the following quad-
ripartite division of the different types of love: (1) A “pure” love (καθαρός), which is 
removed from the sexual union of bodies and pertains to the “moderates”, and may (1a) 
accompany or (1b) may not accompany the reminiscence of transcendent Beauty. (2) 
A “mixed” love, which tends towards sexual union and pertains to the “immoderates”, 
and (2a) may be in accordance with nature and remain on the path of moderation (het-
erosexual), or (2b) may be against nature (homosexuality and sexual deviance).
Mixed love, involving sexual union that enables the conception of children, is morally 
good. Consequently, sexual union “in accordance with nature” may be viewed from two 
perspectives (2a) and (2b): “But, to return to the point, (1) those who love beautiful bod-
ies, but not13 for sexual reasons (διὰ μίξιν ἐρῶντες), love them because they are beautiful 
(ὅτι καλά ἐστιν) and (2) there are also those who have the love – which is called mixed 
(τὸν λεγόμενον μικτὸν ἔρωτα) – (2a) for women in order to perpetuate the race, but 
(2b) if it is love for other than women they are making a mistake (σφαλλόμενοι)” (Plot. 
3.5.1.55–59; transl. Gerson: 2017: p. 294; see also Igal 1985: p. 124).
11 In Lg. (8.838e–839d), Plato lists a series of practices that deviate from nature.
12 “But those who want to generate illicitly and contrary to nature (Οἳ δ’ ἂν ἐν παρανόμῳ καὶ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν 
ἐθέλωσι γεννᾶν), take their start on the natural course, but as they begin to veer off-course, lie there in col-
lapse as though they had slipped off the proper road, without understanding where love has led them or 
their desire for generation or the right use of beauty’s image or what beauty is in itself” (Plot. 3.5.1.50–55; 
transl. Gerson 2017: p. 294). Here, Plotinus uses the plural “those who” (Οἳ δ’ ἂν) to refer to the lovers 
“who wish to generate” in an “illegitimate manner” that is “outside the law” (ἐν παρανόμῳ) and “against 
nature” (παρὰ τὴν φύσιν). This censure on the part of Plotinus may be supported by two theses taken from 
Book VIII of the Laws, in which Plato condemns all sexual practices that do not contribute to legitimate 
conception (homosexuality, incest, sodomy, onanism). See Brisson & Pradeau (2006: p. 321, n. 67).
13 Reading καλῶν [καὶ] <μὴ> διὰ with Henry & Schwyzer’s (1964–1982: vol. 3, p. 314) addenda ad textum 
following Ficino’s original emendation. See Igal (1985: p. 118), and see also Gerson (2017: p. 294, n. 12).
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Through procreation, man finds a way to make himself part of the cosmic totality 
(Morvan 2013: p. 178), and performs – on Earth – a task that forges a link between mor-
tals and the gods. Instead of an ἀνάβασις, which seeks to replace the gods, procreation 
is a κατάβασις of the divine, in which Eros is the mediator, the μέγας δαίμων, between the 
mortal and the immortal. Mixed love is fecund, and sexual union ensures the continua-
tion of the generations.
Plotinus’s reproach is directed specifically at those who deviate from their natural 
course, as though they were straying from their path: in other words, at a certain point 
they deviate from their route by moving in a direction that takes them away from a path 
they had initially embarked upon correctly. Later, Plotinus indicates that the loves that 
are “against nature” (παρὰ τὴν φύσιν) are those that do not proceed from the activity that 
pertains to the soul, to its “nature” (φύσις) (Plot. 3.5.7.40–45);14 rather, they are passive 
affections, produced by an entity that is not of the soul and which is identified with vice, 
and which converts them into “excrescences” (συνυφιστάμενα) (Plot. 3.5.7.44). Going 
against the nature of the soul means seeking physical pleasure instead of intelligible 
beauty, as the disordered inclination of the soul towards matter results in the creation of 
vice. In fact, for Plotinus, the Gnostics deviated from the interpretation of Timaeus, and 
this dissociation led them to engage in sexual practices that were against nature.
Marcella was a rich widow and the mother of five daughters and two sons. Her second 
marriage was to Porphyry (223/4 – c.305 AD), who dedicated the Letter to His Wife 
Marcella to her after the couple had lived together for just ten months (Porph. Marc. 
4.106.23). At the start of the letter, Porphyry justifies their marriage, which had under-
gone a series of slanders at the hands of Marcella’s fellow citizens and even caused her 
to fear for her life (Marc. 1.104.18–105.3) with recourse to the following “two honourable 
reasons”: (1) the “gods of birth”,15 and (2) coming to the aid of a friend’s widow and 
her children, in light of the fact that Marcella demonstrated a “natural aptitude for true 
philosophy (πρὸς τὴν ὀρθὴν φιλοσοφίαν)” (Marc. 3.105.20–21).
In the anthropology of the early Neoplatonists, the body is not considered to be an 
integral part of man: consequently, sexual activity is blocked by the movement of an 
ascesis that is hostile to the notion of contact between bodies. Porphyry, who wrote the 
letter to his wife while he was travelling,16 and in order to console her while she was suf-
fering during his temporary absence, told her that the true Porphyry cannot be, for her, 
the one who touches her; rather, he is the one who transcends the senses and is only 
captured by thought (Marc. 8.110.3–7; see also 32.124.20–21). Thus, the body is nothing 
more than an “image” or a “reflection”. Porphyry tries to make his wife understand that, 
14 Here the meaning of the term φύσις is very close to that of ὑπόστασις.
15 The gods of family and race are also the “gods of birth” (Pl. Lg. 5.729c7) or “those who preside over 
procreation” (Lg. 9.879d2). See Des Places (1982: p. 157, n. 2).
16 Some have speculated that Porphyry was asked by the emperor Diocletian to travel to the East in order 
to take part in a preparatory meeting ahead of the great persecution of the Christians that took place in 
the year 303. However, if we take the testimony of Lactantius (De mortibus persecutorun 11.3 and 6), into 
account, this hypothesis presents certain difficulties. See Goulet (2004: p. 101).
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in the movement of an ascesis that is hostile to contact between bodies, it does not not 
matter if he is with her physically.
The human soul can ascend and return to its origins, or travel downwards and become 
submerged in oblivion.17 The first status of the soul, symbolised by Poros, corresponds 
to the conversion to the intelligible; the second, symbolised by Penia, corresponds to 
the conversion to the sensible.18 In On the Cave of the Nymphs (16), Porphyry connects the 
two mythical episodes that link honey to the “red nectar” consumed by the gods: (1) the 
speech given by Diotima in Plato’s Symposium (203b), in which Poros is saturated with 
nectar; and (2) the Orphic motif that alludes to the intoxicating power of honey (OF 189 
K = 221 F Bernabé). Honey is related to drunkenness and sleep.19 In Orpheus, honey 
causes Kronos to fall into Zeus’s trap, who is thus able to bind and castrate him.
Honey possesses three qualities: (1) purification,20 (2) preservation, and (3) sweetness 
(Porph. Antr. 15). Porphyry associates the third quality, sweetness, with sexual union.21 In 
fact, according to Simonini’s (1986: pp. 163–164) interpretation, the section dedicated 
to the sweetness of honey and its association with sexual pleasure refers to the soul’s 
descent to the body and its consequent loss of autonomy by becoming embodied. Sexual 
pleasure prompts the divine beings to spread their seed, in order to disseminate their 
power of generation. To describe this dissemination on the part of divine beings, Por-
phyry employs astronomical terminology: the sphere of Saturn (Kronos) occupies the 
primary position opposite Ouranos, the heaven of fixed stars, followed by the sphere of 
Zeus. Thus, the divine powers are transmitted from Ouranos to the sphere of Zeus by 
way of the sphere of Kronos.
“That is, right here in this world the breath (τὸ πνεῦμα) becomes damp or saturated, 
as a function of its sexual desire, and the soul drags a damp vapor along with it from 
its descent toward generation” (Porph. Antr. 11.18–20; transl. Lamberton 1983: p. 28, 
slightly amended).
The souls that descend during generation are associated with water, which implies 
their true death;22 pure souls, in contrast, avoid generation, and only they are wise. 
In order to confirm this association, Porphyry draws upon Heraclitus: “A dry soul 
is wisest (ξηρὰ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη)” (DK 22B118 = 103 Marcovich; Antr. 11.18–19). Por-
phyry describes the descent of the souls as a process in which their “breath” (πνεῦμα) 
becomes heavier due to the absorption of moisture. Upon completion of the descent, 
this enlargement of the breath makes the souls more “visible” (ὁραταί). Certain souls 
do not manage to master their breath, and are instead dominated by it, becoming 
17 See Porph. Sent. 3, 4, 28, 30 and 32; Orac.Chald. Fr. 172 Des Places.
18 Hadot (1968: pp. 90–91, n. 1) draws a parallel between Porph. Abst. 3.27, and Sent. 37 and 40.
19 See OF 154 K = 220 F, 222 F Bernabé; OF 137, 154, 220 K = 225 F Bernabé.
20 See Arist. HA 4.535a1–3; 8.596b15–18. In Porph. Antr. 15 and 19, honey, which is used in the ritual, 
symbolises the moral purification that guarantees the initiation.
21 See Porph. Antr. 16.249–257. See Giavatto (2019: pp. 206–208).
22 Ficino translates it as lux sicca. Philo of Alexandria attributed this formula to Heraclitus in order to 
define the best and wisest soul. For the soul, death consists of becoming “wet”; see B 77 DK.
169
José María Zamora Calvo












absorbed by its passionate aspects; other souls, in contrast, draw support from their 
breath and are able to master it.23
According to Damascius’s Life of Isidore (Fr. 54.80.1–11 Zintzen), Hierocles (c.1st half 
5th century AD) taught philosophy in Alexandria, where his pupils included the afore-
mentioned Theosebius.24 Hierocles’s philosophical architecture lies within the sphere of 
Neoplatonism, between the approaches of Iamblichus and Syrianus – Proclus (I. Hadot 
2015: pp. 99–124). He dedicated his treatise On Providence and Fate and the Relationship 
of Free Will to Divine Governance to the diplomat Olympiodorus, who had a passion for 
philosophy and possessed his own “political philosophy”: he successfully participated in 
a number of Roman embassies, which brought him significant honours.25 Of the original 
seven-volume treatise, only a few fragments remain, in the form of two short summaries 
written by the patriarch Photius (c.815 – c.897) in codices 214 and 251 of his Myriobib-
lion.26 One of the sections of this treatise explores a subject that is of particular interest 
to our study. In the distinction that is made by Plato in Phaedrus (248a–249b), Hierocles 
observes a juxtaposition of the philosopher and the lover (ἐρωτικός).
The “philosopher” dedicates himself to a life of contemplation, avoiding political activ-
ity and purifying himself in the search for union with the divine; the “lover”, in contrast, 
is identified with the philosopher-king of Plato’s Republic (5.473c–d; 501e–502c; see also 
Ep. 7.326a2–b4), who communicates the intelligible good to others, shapes the city in 
accordance with paradigms of the divine, just and beautiful, and thereby applies con-
templative intelligence to the sphere of political action.27 In this juxtaposition Hierocles 
delves deeper into the equivalence of the philosopher and the lover, in light of the fact 
that in the contemplative life of the former, the focus and pull towards an individual way 
of life (ἰδιοπραγία) predominates; while for the lover, it is philanthropy (φιλανθρωπία) that 
predominates (Hierocl. Prou. 465a [t. VII, p. 202 Henry]).
Thus, Hierocles articulates the Plotinian distinction between the contemplative union 
with the One and the political expression of this union (Plot. 6.9.7). However, although 
Hierocles clearly defends the superiority of the contemplative union, in line with the 
thesis of Neoplatonism, he takes an innovative approach with his support for the “lover”, 
whom he identifies with the philosopher-king. The extrinsic value of the life of the 
lover – philosopher-king, which is linked to philanthropy, balances out the intrinsic value 
of the contemplative life. Thus, Hierocles’s philanthropy makes it possible to communi-
cate the fecundity of the transcendent Good to another, through the mediation of the 
lover – philosopher-king (O’Meara 1993: pp. 69, 72). From its first Plotinian articulation, 
23 Porph. Abst. 2.38.2 and 4. These two types of soul correspond to the duality of good and evil demons. 
For terrestrial life, including plants, moisture is necessary (Antr. 10.19–20).
24 See also Dam. V. Isid. Fr. 106.83.1–4; 56–59.82 and 84 Zintzen.
25 See Phot. Bibl. cod. 214.171b22 ff. (t. III, p. 125 Henry). It is most likely Olympiodorus of Thebes, an 
Egyptian historian who was part of a diplomatic mission to the Huns in the year 412 (cod. 80.58b37; t. I, 
p. 173 Henry).
26 Phot. Bibl. cod. 214 (t. III, pp. 125–130 Henry), and cod. 251 (t. VII, pp. 189–206 Henry). See Aujoulat 
(1996).
27 Hierocl. Prou., ap. Phot. Bibl. cod. 251.464b (t. VII, p. 200 Henry; ed. R. Henry, VII, Paris, 1974, p. 200).
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the Neoplatonic metaphysical principle, expressed in its medieval formulation as bonum 
est diffusivum sui,28 indicates that all of reality unfolds in a series of levels from the abso-
lute perfection of the One-Good, which is the first principle and absolute power of all 
things (Plot. 5.4.2.37–43).29 For Proclus, certain souls, having shared the transcendent 
good in the divine life, imitate the Good by attempting to communicate the good to infe-
rior beings.30 Thus, in order to describe the contemplative involvement of the transcend-
ent Good that infuses a movement of communication of the good to others, Hierocles 
adopts the terminology of eroticism, in which the lover is the philosopher-king of Plato’s 
Republic (5.473b–d; 502c; see also Ep. 7.327a–340a).
In the 5th century AD, Hermias of Alexandria, who studied alongside Proclus (412–
485) at the Neoplatonic school in Athens, wrote a commentary on Phaedrus based on 
his notes from a seminar that his master, Syrianus (d. 437?), had given on the subject of 
Plato’s dialogue.31 Hermias’s commentary is the only exegetical study of Phaedrus from 
Antiquity that has survived through to the present day.32
For Hermias, the central theme (σκοπός) of Phaedrus is “beauty of every kind (τοῦ 
παντοδαποῦ καλοῦ)” (Herm. in Phdr. 9.9–10; 9.11.20). The dialogue explores the gradual 
ascent to true Beauty, from the lower level (corporeal beauty), up through the beauty of 
speech, and towards the beauty of the soul, finally ascending to intellectual beauty. In 
his exegesis, which follows the Neoplatonic rules of interpretation established by Iam-
blichus, Hermias connects these three dialogues hermeneutically: Phaedrus, Symposium 
and First Alcibiades.
In his Commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus, Hermias also examines the problem of sexuality. 
The demonology of Middle Platonism was still present in Neoplatonism, albeit inter-
preted according to hermeneutic rules and the doctrinal principles of the post-Plotinian 
approach (Moreschini 2017: pp. 132–135). However, in his exegesis, Hermias (Syrianus) 
highlights the role played by demons in transmitting enthusiasm from the gods to the 
irrational faculties of the soul (Herm. in Phdr. 85.14–21; see Lortie 2017: pp. 216–218). 
The demons “set in motion” (κινούντων) (in Phdr. 85.20) certain forms that are derived 
from enthusiasm and, ultimately, originate with the gods, thereby illuminating both the 
intellective faculty (νοῦς) and the other faculties of the human soul: discursive thought 
28 The One-Good, beyond the intelligible (Plot. 5.1.8.7–8; 5.3.11.28; 6.8.11.8–9). On this principle of Neopla-
tonic metaphysics, see Kremer (1987).
29 On the One, or the Good, “power of everything” (δύναμις πάντων), or “total power” (δύναμις πᾶσα) in 
Plotinus, see Zamora Calvo (2016).
30 Procl. De malorum subsistenita 23 (Isaac 1982: p. 58); see O’Meara (2003: pp. 209–210).
31 Dillon (1994: p. 388): “Hermeias is really just transcribing the proceedings of his master Syrianus’ semi-
nar”. See also, Westerink & Trouillard & Segonds (1990: p. X): “Le Commentaire du Phèdre que nous 
possédons sous son nom n’est qu’un ensemble de notes non révisées prises au cours de Syrianus sur ce 
dialogue”. Regarding this commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus we have the edition by Lucarini & Moreschini 
(2013), which replaces the only earlier critical edition (Couvreur 1901) and includes complete indices. 
There is also a version in Romanian, accompanied by a translation of Plato’s Phaedo and Phaedrus by 
Lijceau & Cornea & Bercea (1983); a German translation by Bernard (1997), and a recent English transla-
tion by Baltzly & Share (2018).
32 Baltzly & Share (2018: p. 1): “Hermias’commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato is the only example of the 
Neoplatonic commentaries on this dialogue to have survived in it entirety”.
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(διάνοια), opinion (δόξα), imagination (φαντασία), ardour (θυμός) and desire (ἐπιθυμία). 
Thus, the demon plays a providential role, as it guides the destiny of man, i.e. a soul 
that makes use of a body, extending its activities to encompass faculties that are, strictly 
speaking, human, whose highest point is reason and whose extremes correspond to 
sexual desires, which are included in the nutritive-reproductive faculty.
Hermias defends the elevatory power of the Socratic eros, along with the image of 
Socrates as a divinely inspired teacher. Roskam (2014) demonstrates that, in Hermias’s 
commentary on Phaedrus, Socrates is portrayed as an ideal teacher whose aim is to ele-
vate the soul to the intelligible world, beyond the corporeal world of sensible pleasures. 
Thus, for Hermias, Socrates is a contemplative philosopher who highlights the need to 
ascend to the divine and achieve consequent purification.
In his reading of the Socratic eros, Hermias banishes the concept of corporeal love. 
In his interpretation of Phaedrus, he applies a methodology in which the Symposium 
provides him with a panoramic perspective of eros33 and First Alcibiades provides him 
with a specific perspective on knowledge itself and the strategics of purification. From 
this hermeneutic perspective, Hermias suggests that although they may reject corporeal 
pleasure, lovers can still come together and maintain sexual contact, provided it remains 
moderate and controlled. For Hermias, even though a true lover may touch his beloved, 
he always does so with self-control (Herm. in Phdr. 201.13–14).
The exegetic methodology Hermias employs in his commentary on Phaedrus shares 
certain traits with Proclus’s Commentary on the First Alcibiades. In fact, from this herme-
neutic perspective, Phaedrus is linked to self-knowledge, which constitutes the purpose 
or central theme (σκοπός) of the dialogue. However, this purpose, which is linked to the 
practice of the Neoplatonic exegetical method, occurs over the course of the dialogue, 
at the end of the demonstrations that themselves include a second purpose: that of “self-
care”. Thus, Proclus assigns a central position, or an ultimate purpose, to the idea of 
“self-care”, to which he subordinates the idea of “self-knowledge”. The Delphic precept 
is accompanied by a specific ethical usage, of an eminently practical nature. Without 
self-knowledge, there can be no self-care.
Dillon (1994) shows how, through their commentaries, the Neoplatonists – and espe-
cially Proclus – view the First Alcibiades as a kind of ars amatoria oriented towards the 
practising of a true and shared form of love. Consequently, from this perspective, the 
dialogue serves a preliminary function, as the purpose of the encounter lies in a practice 
– that of “true eroticism” – that is no longer based on the exchange of words, but on 
a sexual exchange, i.e. the union between the lover and his beloved. “This, then, may be 
observed in the case of this present association (ταύτης συνουσίας); there is in Socrates 
a perfection of love and true knowledge (ἐρωτικὴ καὶ ἐπιστημονικὴ τελειότης) possess-
ing a ready beneficence towards his beloved, and there is in Alcibiades a suitability for 
perfection (τῆς τελειώσεως ἐπιτηδειότης). Which is the reason why he says ‘you have only 
just forestalled me (σμικρόν με ἔφθης),’ as if he himself, of his own accord, were already 
33 Herm. in Phdr. 201.13–14: ὁ γὰρ γνήσιος ἐραστὴς καὶ ἁπτόμενος σωφρόνως ἅπτεται. See Roskam (2014: 
pp. 32). Bernard (1997: p. 24–25) suggests that Hermias interprets Phaedrus through the prism of the 
Symposium.
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stirred towards Socrates” (Procl. in Alc. 123.17–124.2 Westerink; transl. O’Neill 1971: 
p. 81).
For Proclus, the erotic science provides the intermediary force of communication. 
Without it, it is not possible to communicate the Good or achieve (intellectual) union 
with the divine. The exchange between teacher and pupil is a form of communicating 
the Good.
Eroticism serves as a guide, moving words into the background in order to allow the 
union to communicate the Good. In his Commentary on Plato’s Republic (Essay 6), Proclus 
offers a mythological interpretation of the sexual union between Hera and Zeus: it is 
a mythological representation of the loves of the gods “concerned with reversion of the 
lower beings (ἐπιστρεπτικοὶ τῶν καταδεεστέρων) towards the first things (εἰς τὰ πρῶτα), 
and with filling (ἀποπληρωτικοὶ) them with the good things that are in the higher beings 
themselves, and with bringing to perfection those lower than themselves (τελεσιουργοὶ 
τῶν ὑφειμένων)” (Procl. in R. 1.136.24–26; transl. Baltzly & Finamore & Miles 2018: 
p. 250).34 Thus, union enables communication of the Good.
However, in order for this communication to occur, there must be a place that facili-
tates the union (Procl. in Alc. 123.8–9); “and in some way the perfection of the giver 
must coincide with the suitability of the recipient” (in Alc. 123.10–12; transl. O’Neill 
1971: p. 81). Consequently, there are two conditions that must be met: (1) on the part of 
the giver, there must be perfect power, a “superabundance”; and (2) the recipient must 
be well-disposed to receive. Likewise, in order for communication of the good to occur, 
three conditions must be met: (1) the “opportune moment” (καιρός) for each activity, “as 
supplying the good and the ultimate purpose to the doers and to what is actually being 
done” (Procl. in Alc.121.18–20); (2) this moment must proceed from the divine beings, 
it cannot be the product of random chance; and (3) the perfection of the giver must 
coincide with the suitability of the recipient: the giver must possess a “perfect power”, 
a “superabundance” of good, while the recipient must be well-disposed to receive (in Alc. 
123.1–13). Socrates’s “erotic and scientific perfection” is the driver of the communica-
tion that enables the sharing of the same place, which is in fact necessary given that the 
cause is corporeal (Van der Meere 2017: pp. 258–259).
In his Commentary on the First Alcibiades (34.16–36.20), Proclus, while examining the 
qualities that distinguish the “divine (θεῖος) lover” from the “vulgar and coarse lover 
(δημώδης καὶ φορτικὸς ἐραστὴς)” (in Alc. 35.3–5), draws up a list of five differences between 
these two types of lover. Subsequently, in the 6th century, Olympiodorus of Alexandria 
(in Alc. 13.12–14.9; and in Grg. 135.22–24) condenses Proclus’s classification into three 
types of difference between the “divinely inspired lover” (ἒνθεος ἐραστής) and the “vulgar 
lover” (φορτικὸς ἐραστής), to which he also adds a fourth difference, drawn from Phae-
drus (238e1–240a8): (1) The vulgar lover admires the object of his loves, while the divine 
lover is the one who is admired.35 (2) The vulgar lover moderates his love as his beloved 
34 See also Procl. in R. 2.296.21–27: the soul “joins with the first terms”.
35 According to Olympiodorus, this interpretation is found in the expression: “Son of Kleinias, I think you 
admire”, which Olympiodorus takes to mean “I think you admire me” (= Procl. in Alc. 35.6–13). See 
Segonds (1985–1986: vol. 1, p. 144, n. 5).
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grows older, and soon distances himself from the object of his loves; the divinely inspired 
lover, however, accompanies the object of his loves “from the cradle to the grave”.36 (3) 
The vulgar lover is present in his loves and wishes to act in accordance with the sensa-
tions of the body, and in particular to employ the last of the senses, i.e. touch (as he 
desires to touch); in contrast, the divinely inspired lover engages in an exchange with his 
loves “without being present” (ἀπαρουσιάστως)37 and in a divine fashion.38 (4) The vulgar 
lover is present in his loves in order to bring them to ruin, in terms of body, soul and 
the exterior good; however, the divinely inspired lover does not act in the same way, and 
nor does he pursue the same goals: rather, he is present in his loves for their own good, 
as he directs them towards beautiful objects (Olymp. in Alc. 14.4–9).39
Regarding the fourth difference between the two classes of lovers, which corresponds 
to Olympiodorus’s third category, Proclus notes that the divinely inspired lover accom-
panies his beloved, albeit separated from them (κεχώρισται αὐτοῦ) in a certain sense, as 
he does not touch them (μήτε ἁπτόμενος) or maintain sexual relations (μήτε προσομιλῶν)40 
with them, or even converse with them (μήθ’ ὅλως διαλεγόμενος) until the opportune 
moment (καιρός) arrives in which to do so (Procl. in Alc. 36.4–7 Westerink); in contrast, 
the vulgar lover “loves to unite with his beloved” (Segonds 1985–1986: vol. 1, p. 29).
For Proclus, true love means the love of what is beautiful.41 As the good lies beyond 
the beautiful, it can only arouse desire in us, not love.42 The starting point is the same 
passage from Plato’s Symposium (210a4–211c9) that Plotinus uses (1.6.4.7–9; 5.2–5; 9.3–
6).43 Adhering to a hermeneutic strategy that will be found also in Olympiodorus (in 
Alc. 119.4–6), Proclus constructs the following syllogism: “so if (εἰ οὖν) all the good is 
desirable (πᾶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐφετόν), all the desirable lovable (ἐραστόν), and all the lovable 
36 This difference is highlighted in the phrase: “Having been the first lover, while the others have given up; 
I am the only one who has not withdrawn”. In other words: “that he follows the object of his loves before 
the other lovers, at the same time as them, and after them” (= Procl. in Alc. 35.13–24).
37 Olymp. in Alc. 13.24, hapax: adv. ἀπαρουσιάστως, “not in person”, “not present”. In the same way that the 
divine is present in all parts, illuminating even though it is entirely absent (in the sense that it is not in 
any particular place), the divinely inspired lover is both present and absent, in imitation of the divine.
38 In the passage: “While the others were disagreeable to you, I, throughout all those years, did not address 
you”; or in other words, “with his silence, he established a distance; however, by providing love and com-
panionship, he was present” (= Procl. in Alc. 36.5–11).
39 See the corresponding passage in Phaedrus (238e1–240a8) that is taken as a reference (or serves as inspi-
ration) to define this fourth difference that is not included in Proclus’s commentary.
40 Here, the term προσομιλῶν not only means “associate”, but may also mean “maintain sexual relations” 
(LSJ s.v.). In any case, in this passage it cannot simply mean “converse”, as becomes clear in the text that 
follows it: μήθ’ ὅλως διαλεγόμενος. See Roskam (2014: pp. 30–31, and 185–186, n. 70).
41 See Procl. Theol.Plat. 1.25.109.10–16. See Segonds (1985–1986: vol. 2, p. 455, n. 4).
42 See Plot. 1.6.9.32–43; 1.6.7.12–14.
43 “Conversely: all the good is desirable (this is self-evident), all the desirable is lovable (love and desire have 
the same object [γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρως καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις]), but differ from each other in moderation or inten-
sity of desire (κατὰ τὴν ἄνεσιν ἢ τὴν συντονίαν τῆς ἐφέσεως)” (Procl. in Alc. 329.22–25; transl. O’Neill 1971: 
p. 216). On the difference between love (ἔρως) and desire (ἔφεσις), see Dam. in Phil. 16.18–21. Proclus 
bases his argument on a passage from Plato’s Symposium (204b3), in which Socrates elevates love up to the 
level of the good through the mediation of the beautiful, and states that the good is an object of love, as 
well as the beautiful.
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beautiful (καλόν) (since love is immediately of beauty [προσεχῶς γὰρ ὁ ἔρως κάλλους ἐστί]) 
then all the good is beautiful (πᾶν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν)” (in Alc. 329.23–330.1; transl. 
O’Neill 1971: p. 216).
Hermias’s commentary on Phaedrus, as well as Proclus’s and Olympiodorus’s com-
mentaries on First Alcibiades, offer a coherent image of the Socratic eros and of sexuality, 
based on an innovative exegesis of the Platonic dialogues and providing a hermeneutic 
connection to Phaedrus, Symposium and First Alcibiades. The three commentaries empha-
sise the elevatory power of the Socratic eros.
Sexuality in Neoplatonism is far removed from what is habitually referred to as “Pla-
tonic love” as defined in the Collins English Dictionary (Anderson & Butterfield & Crozier 
2006: s.v. 2) “(usually lc) an intimate companionship or relationship, esp. between two 
persons of the opposite sex, that is characterized by the absence of sexual involvement; 
a spiritual affection”. Although the concept of “Platonic love” was developed during 
the Renaissance by Basilios Bessarion (c.1403–1472) and Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499),44 
a number of passages in Plato’s dialogues recommend abstaining from sexual relations 
within a truly loving relationship.
The Neoplatonists explore sexuality through the prisms of cosmology, ethics and Pla-
tonic political theory; specifically, they construct their arguments on the basis of an 
exegesis of the Symposium, Phaedrus and First Alcibiades. This exegetic innovation ena-
bles them to balance the confrontation between purely intellectual love and desire of 
a strictly sexual nature. In this respect, for some Neoplatonists the “Platonic eros” is 
a larger whole that incorporates sexuality within it. Indeed, if we examine the texts on 
love that were written by the Neoplatonists during the period of Late Antiquity, from 
the founding of the movement in Plotinus’s school in Rome during the 3rd century, 
through to the final classes taught by Olympiodorus at his school in Alexandria in the 
6th century, we find that all of them consider the cosmos to be an image of an intel-
ligible model. It is not possible to talk of sex without understanding the architecture of 
the intelligible universe and its projection in the sensible world. For the Neoplatonists, 
cosmology provides a model for ethics and politics: sex cannot be dissociated from the 
cosmos, and sexuality cannot be dissociated from cosmology.
44 In the Platonic circles of Renaissance Florence, Bessarion and Ficino developed an interpretation of 
Greek love as a type of spiritual practice. According to Bessarion (1503), Platonic love is the love that 
is “honourable, modest, demure, loyal, holy, blessed, a safeguard of chastity and continence, 
generously inspiring the soul and loving and obedient to virtue” (In Calumniatorem Platonis 
4.2). In his commentaries on the Symposium and Phaedrus, Ficino explores this allegorical exegesis of 
Greek love that was instigated by his teacher, Bessarion, and repositions the discussion of “Greek love” 
within a broader discussion on the subject of “divine love”. This metaphysical form of love is far removed 
from any earthly passions related to sexuality. See e.g. Blanshard (2010: pp. 27–28).
175
José María Zamora Calvo













Adrados, F. R. (Ed.). (1980). Diccionario griego-español (DGE) (Vol. 1). Madrid: CSIC.
Anderson, S., Butterfield, J., & Crozier, J. (Eds.). (2006). Collins English Dictionary (8th ed.). Glas-
gow: HarperCollins.
Aujoulat, N. (1996). Sur le début du De providentia d’Hiéroclès d’Alexandrie: Photius, Bibliothèque, 
Codex 251, 460 b, 24-461 a, 22. Byzantinoslavica, 57(2), 217–228.
Armstrong, A. H. (Transl.). (1967). Plotinus, III: Enneads III. 1–9. London – Cambridge, Mass.: 
Heinemann – Harvard University Press.
Athanassiadi, P. (Ed.). (1999). Damascius: The Philosophical History. Athens: Apamea Cultural Asso-
ciation.
Aubry, G. (2013). (Comment) les Grecs ont-ils pensé la laideur?. In J.-J. Duhot (Ed.), L’archaïque, 
le réel et la littérature. Quelques chemins en hommage à Gilbert Romeyer Dherbey (pp. 33–46). Lyon: 
J. André.
Baltzly, D., Finamore, J. F., & Miles, G. (Transl.). (2018). Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Republic 
(Vol. 1: Essays 1–6). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baltzly, D., & Share, M. (Transl.). (2018). Hermias: On Plato Phaedrus 227A–245E. London: Blooms-
bury.
Blanshard, A. J. L. (2010). Sex: Vice and Love from Antiquity to Modernity. Malden, MA: Wiley-Black-
well.
Bernabé, A. (Ed.). (2004). Poetae epici graeci: testimonia et fragmenta, II: Orphicorum et orphicis simi-
lium testimonia et fragmenta (Fasc. 1). München – Leipzig: K. G. Saur.
Bernard, H. (Ed.). (1997). Hermeias von Alexandrien: Kommentar zu Platons Phaidros. Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck.
Bessarion, B. (1503). In calumniatorem Platonis libri quatuor. Venetiis: in aedibus Aldi Romani.
Bouffartigue, J., Patillon, M., & Segonds, A. P. (Eds.). (1977–1995). Porphyre. De l’abstinence (3 vols.). 
Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Brisson, L., & Pradeau, J.-F. (Transl.). (2006). Platon. Les lois. Livres I à VI. Livres VII à XII. (Vol. 2). 
Paris: Flammarion.
Burnet, J. (Ed.). (1900–1907). Platonis Opera (5 vols.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Couvreur, P. (Ed.). (1901). Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum scholia. Paris: Bouillon.
Creed, J. L. (Ed.). (1984). Lactantius: De mortibus persecutorum. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Des Places, E. (Ed.). (1971). Oracles chaldaïques: avec un choix de commentaires anciens. Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres.
Des Places, E. (Ed.). (1982). Porphyre. Vie de Pythagore; Lettre à Marcella. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Diels, H., & Kranz, W. (Eds.). (1951). Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: griechisch und deutsch (DK) 
(Vol. 1). Berlin: Weidmann.
Dillon, J. (1994). A Platonist Ars Amatoria. Classical Quarterly, 44(2), 387–392.
Dover, K. J. (1979). Greek Homosexuality. London: Duckworth.
Duffy, J. M., Sheridan, P. F., Westerink, L. G., & White, J. A. (Eds.). (1969). Porphyry, The Cave of the 
Nymphs in the Odyssey. Buffalo: Department of Classics, State University of New York at Buffalo.
Fortier, S. (2018). The Nature of the Scholia on Plato’s Phaedrus. Phronesis, 63(4), 449–476.
Gerson, L. P. (Transl.). (2017). Plotinus: The Enneads. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
176
José María Zamora Calvo












Giavatto, A. (2019). Notes sur le § 13–19. In T. Dorandi (Ed.), Porphyre. L’Antre des nymphes dans 
l’Odyssée (pp. 200–210). Paris: Vrin.
Goulet, R. (2004). Hypothèses récentes sur le traité de Porphyre Contre les Chrétiens. In M. Narcy, 
& E. Rebillard (Eds.), Hellénisme et christianisme (pp. 61–109). Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses univer-
sitaires du Septentrion.
Goulet, R. (2016). Théosébios. In R. Goulet (Ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, VI: De Sabi-
nillus à Tyrsénos (pp. 1128–1129). Paris: CNRS.
Hadot, I. (2015). Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Aristotle and Plato 
(Transl. M. Chase). Leiden – Boston: Brill.
Hadot, P. (1968). Porphyre et Victorinus (Vol. 1). Paris: Études augustiniennes.
Hadot, P. (Transl.). (1990). Plotin, Traité 50: [Ennéades] III, 5. Paris: Cerf.
Henry, R. (1959–1974) (Ed.). Photius, Bibliothèque (Vols I–VII). Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Henry, P., & Schwyzer, H.-R. (Eds.). (1964–1982). Plotini Opera (3 vols.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Igal, J. (Transl.). (1985). Plotino: Enéadas III–IV. Madrid: Gredos.
Isaac, D. (Ed.). (1982). Proclus: Trois études sur la providence, III: De l’existence du mal. Paris: Les Belles 
Lettres.
Kern, O. (Ed.). (1922). Orphicorum fragmenta. Berlin: Weidmann.
Kremer, K. (1987). Bonum est diffusivum sui. Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Neuplatonismus und 
Christentum. In W. Haase (Ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (Vol. 36.2; pp. 994–
1032). Berlin – New York: De Gruyter.
Kroll, W. (Ed.). (1899–1901). Procli Diadochi in Platonis rem publicam commentarii (2 vols.). Leipzig: 
Teubner.
Lamberton, R. (Transl.). (1983). Porphyry. On the Cave of the Nymphs. Barrytown, NY: Station Hill 
Press.
Lamberz, E. (Ed.). (1975). Porphyrii Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes. Leipzig: Teubner.
Louis, P. (Ed.). (1964). Aristote. Histoire des animaux, I: Livres I–IV. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
LSJ = Liddell, H. G., Scott, R., & Jones, H. S. (1996). A Greek-English Lexicon (with a revised supple-
ment). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lucarini, C. M., & Moreschini, C. (Eds.). (2013). Hermias Alexandrinus: In Platonis Phaedrum Scho-
lia. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Marcovich, M. (Ed.). (1967). Heraclitus: Greek Text with a Short Commentary. Mérida: The Los Andes 
University Press.
Moreschini, C. (2017). Le démon de Socrate et son langage dans la philosophie médioplato-
nicienne. In L. Soares Santoprete, & P. Hoffmann (Eds.), Langage des dieux, langage des démons, 
langage des hommes dans l’Antiquité (pp. 121–135). Turnhout: Brepols.
Morvan, T. (2013). Érôs et le lien cosmique: lecture ancienne et nouvelle du Banquet de Platon. Paris: 
L’Harmattan.
Nauck, A. (Ed.). (1886). Porphyrii philosophi Platonici opuscula selecta. Leipzig: Teubner.
O’Meara, D. J. (1993). Aspects of Political Philosophy in Iamblichus. In H. J. Blumenthal, & 
E. G. Clark (Eds.), The Divine Iamblichus: Philosopher and Man of Gods (pp. 65–73). London: 
Bristol Classical Press.
O’Meara, D. J. (2003). Sur les traces de l’absolu: études de philosophie antique. Fribourg – Paris: Aca-
demic Press Fribourg – Cerf.
177
José María Zamora Calvo












O’Neill, W. (Transl.). (1971). Proclus: Alcibiades I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Roskam, G. (2014). Socratic Love in Neoplatonism. In D. A. Layne, & H. Tarrant (Eds.), The Neo-
platonic Socrates (pp. 21–35). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Saffrey, H. D., & Westerink, L. G. (Eds.). (1968–1997). Proclus: Théologie platonicienne (6 vols.). 
Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Segonds, A. P. (Ed.). (1985–1986). Proclus: Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon (2 vols.). Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres.
Simonini, L. (Transl.). (1986). Porfirio, L’antro delle Ninfe. Milano: Adelphi.
Van der Meeren, S. (2017). L’ ‘entretien’ philosophique d’après le commentaire de Proclus au 
Premier Alcibiade de Platon. In L. G. Soares Santoprete, & P. Hoffmann (Eds.), Langage des dieux, 
langage des démons, langage des hommes dans l’Antiquité (pp. 231–262). Turnhout: Brepols.
Van Riel, G., Macé, C., & Follon, J. (Eds.). (2008). Damascius. Commentaire sur le Philèbe de Platon. 
Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Westerink, L. G. (Ed.). (1954). Proclus Diadochus. Commentary on the first Alcibiades of Plato. Amster-
dam: North-Holland.
Westerink, L. G. (Ed.). (1956). Olympiodorus. Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland.
Westerink, L. G. (Ed.). (1970). Olympiodorus. In Platonis Gorgiam Commentaria. Leipzig: Teubner.
Westerink, L. G., Trouillard, J., & Segonds, A. P. (Eds.). (1990). Prolégomènes à la philosophie de 
Platon. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Wolters, A. M. (1972). Plotinus on Eros: a Detailed Exegetical Study of Enneads III, 5. Amsterdam: Vrije 
Universiteit te Amsterdam.
Zamora Calvo, J. M. (2016). El primer principio, ‘potencia de todas las cosas’, en Plotino. Endoxa, 38, 
131–144 [online available at https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.38.2016.16596].
Zintzen, C. (Ed.). (1967). Damascii Vitae Isidori reliquiae edidit annotationibusque instruxit. Hildesheim: 
Olms.
Prof. José María Zamora Calvo / jm.zamora@uam.es
Department of Philosophy
Autonomous University of Madrid, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts
Campus de Cantoblanco, 28049 Madrid, Spain
This work can be used in accordance with the Creative Commons BY-SA 4.0 International license terms and con-
ditions (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode). This does not apply to works or elements 
(such as image or photographs) that are used in the work under a contractual license or exception or limitation 
to relevant rights.

